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Abstract 
In this paper, as a step towards the ultimate aim of developing an e-
voting system that would be likely to gain and retain the trust of the 
general voting public, we describe a design for a manual voting 
scheme that has, we claim, significant security-related advantages over 
existing well-trusted manual schemes. We then use this design as the 
basis for a small set of (in most cases partially-automated) voting 
systems which could improve the efficiency of our proposed manual 
voting scheme, without endangering the public’s trust. Our approach 
to the design of these schemes is thus as much socio-technical as 
technical. 
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1. Introduction 
Our goal is to develop an e-voting scheme that is both secure and sufficiently understandable 
to gain as high a level of public trust as is achieved by a number of existing manual voting 
schemes, such as that in current use in the UK. Such a scheme would, we suggest, need to be 
regarded by the general public as being as understandable and at least as trustworthy (i.e. 
dependable and secure) as the system they are already used to.  
Note that trustworthiness is a necessary, but by no means always sufficient condition for 
achieving trusted status. The challenge we have chosen to address is therefore as much a 
socio-technical as a technical one – hence differences between the voting practices in 
different countries are highly relevant. We gear much of our discussion to the present UK 
system, though in later sections of the paper we do attempt to generalise our discussion 
somewhat. 
The problems of ensuring public trust in the results of elections have been a matter of concern 
since the time of the ancient Greeks who, in connection with various legal, commercial and 
government activities including elections and lotteries, preferred to put their trust in simple 
gadgets and devices, rather than just in potentially-devious officials [Brumbaugh 1996]. In 
particular, their senate elections were carried out not by a simple showing of hands but by 
issuing little clay balls to the senators, who cast their votes by dropping these in the 
appropriate pot. Paper ballots were first used by the Romans, and the use of standard voting 
forms bearing the pre-printed names of the candidates was introduced in Australia almost a 
hundred and fifty years ago.  
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The earliest voting machines date back just over a hundred years, and various types of voting 
machines and vote-counting machines have been used extensively, particularly in countries 
such as the USA which tend to have relatively complex voting requirements. (A very 
accessible history of voting systems and machines is given in [Jones 2003].) 
The present-day voting process used in the UK national elections [Electoral Commission 
2005] is a manual one, not dissimilar to the original Australian scheme, which involves the 
use of paper ballots with a column of candidates’ names printed down the left-hand column, 
and a right-hand column which provides a corresponding set of boxes in which a vote or votes 
can be marked – see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: A conventional ballot paper 
The entire manual voting process takes place under the close supervision of a set of 
independent officials, and also of representatives of the rival candidates, under the protection 
of a strict legal regime. It involves (i) attendance at a voting station (“polling place”) at which 
the voter identifies herself and is given a ballot paper, marks her vote on this ballot within the 
privacy of a voting booth, and posts the completed ballot through a slit in a locked, sealed 
box, and (ii) the secure transport of these boxes from the voting stations to a vote counting 
centre, where the boxes are unlocked and unsealed, and the manual counting of the votes 
takes place.  
Voters must previously have ensured that their names are on the electoral register. They have 
to cast their votes at a particular voting station, and each such station has a list of the voters, 
extracted from the electoral register, who are registered to vote there. This list is marked as 
each voter is given a ballot paper. Thus the same individual attempting to vote more than 
once or different individuals trying to vote using the same identity, especially at the same 
voting station, are fairly readily detected. (Potentially invalid votes, of various types, are 
identified at the vote counting station, and put to one side while the vote counting proceeds. 
Detailed consideration of such votes is undertaken only if their number is great enough that 
the result of the election could be affected, something that can be determined at constituency 
level in the case of UK General Elections.) 
The close supervision of vote casting and vote counting, the fact that the system is based on 
physical evidence that is retained under seal and can be re-examined if necessary, plus the 
simplicity of each of the stages of the voting process, and indeed of the process as a whole, 
are we suggest what causes it to be regarded by all concerned as trustworthy, at least with 
regard to its ability to deliver an adequately accurate result, albeit sometimes only after 
repeated recounts in the case of close electoral races. It has given rise to very little 
controversy, compared to that which has arisen in recent years around the use of various 
semi-automated or automated systems, especially in the USA [Jones 2004a]. However it 
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benefits from the relative simplicity of UK elections, which in most cases involve choosing 
just one candidate from a short list of candidates. 
There is one concern that is sometimes voiced regarding the confidentiality of each vote. 
Present practice in the UK involves the ballot papers carrying an inconspicuous identification 
number, as portrayed in Figure 1, (actually it is printed on the reverse side of the paper), 
aimed at preventing the use of counterfeit ballot papers, and to assist with the detection of 
alleged fraud. Ballots are torn out of a book of numbered ballot papers and their similarly-
numbered counterfoils, in sequence, and stamped with an identification of the voting station, 
by a supervised voting station official. The voter number, as given in the electoral register, is 
recorded on the counterfoil when the voter is given her ballot paper in the voting station.  
This procedure, the public are informed, is solely to assist any enquiry that might be called for 
after the election should there be allegations of impropriety such as vote rigging or multiple 
voting. Assurances are given that its purpose is not to determine individual votes – and these 
appear, at present, to be generally accepted. (This is perhaps in part because the task of 
tracing back from a large set of ballot papers to the relevant voting stations’ counterfoils in 
order to check some particular aspect of the voting process is evidently a non-trivial manual 
task, in fact one that has apparently – despite rumours to the contrary – not been deemed 
necessary in any UK parliamentary election since 1911 [Electoral Commission 2003].) 
2. Trust – how it is gained and lost 
“We place and refuse trust not because we have torrents of 
information (more is not always better), but because we can trace 
specific bits of information and specific undertakings to particular 
sources on whose veracity and reliability we can run some checks.” 
[O’Neill 2002] 
Trust is usually gained incrementally, and can be lost abruptly. The existing UK manual 
system has been in use for many years, and with the exception of the issue of the 
confidentiality of individual’s votes, receives little criticism. Currently there is however a 
general concern about the level of voter turnout, which compares unfavourably with that in a 
number of other Western European countries. This is motivating official trials of alternative 
schemes and plans to investigate further ones, such as telephone and internet voting, in the 
hope that one or more will prove more convenient than the present manual process and hence 
encourage more people to vote. One such trial, which has been used in several locations in 
recent UK local elections, has been the replacement of the use of voting stations to which 
voters had to go in order to cast their votes by postal voting – it is noteworthy that though 
postal voting is claimed to have increased the number of votes cast, it has also given rise to a 
significant number of allegations of voter fraud, and indeed some successful prosecutions 
[BBC 2005]. Indeed, it could be argued that, in part at least, the increased turnout is due to 
fraudulent voting. 
It is our view that the current level of trust in the manual system used in UK national elections 
is due both to its many years of unchallenged use, and the fact that the general public can 
readily understand the system and believe that it has the characteristic that a large number of 
votes cannot be subverted (changed, replicated or lost) other than by the malicious activities 
of a large number of individuals, who would have to act for the most part in collusion. In fact 
we would argue that the most useful and generally understandable measure of the merit of 
any voting system is what we will term its insubvertibility,1 a robustness-related 
characteristic that we suggest be assessed by dividing the number of votes that could be 
                                                       
1 The OED contains a definition for insubvertible (“incapable of being subverted”) – the term 
insubvertibility, (“the quality of being insubvertible”), though not actually in the OED, seems rather 
appropriate for our needs.  
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altered, faked or lost into the number of people who are needed to achieve such alteration, 
faking or loss. (A more detailed approach to measuring the actual robustness of a system 
against security threats is proposed in [Littlewood 1994].) 
The notion of insubvertibility relates directly to the question of how much trust the voter is 
expected to place in how few people, and to the transparency of the voting process. (For 
simplicity our suggested method of estimating insubvertibility does not distinguish between 
the different types of people who might have to be trusted – officials, political representatives, 
and technical experts – leave alone encompass such difficult to assess factors as likelihood of 
collusion, difficulty of exploitation, risk of detection, etc.) 
In what follows we will take insubvertibility and understandability as the crucial 
characteristics that need to be maximised. Both can, unfortunately, very easily be badly 
affected by ill-thought-out schemes of electronic voting, in which a very small number of 
people in the right position might well be able to subvert the entire election! Other important 
characteristics are of course usability, efficiency and availability, e.g. in the face of denial-of-
service attacks2. (We regard the issue of ballot secrecy (both voter privacy and resistance to 
vote selling and coercion) as being just one aspect of insubvertibility – and ideas such as voter 
receipts, encrypted votes, open source voting software, etc., just as possible contributors to 
achieving it, rather than necessary system requirements to be placed on e-voting.) One can 
contrast these design aims, in particular that of maximising insubvertibility, with those that 
evidently guided Diebold, Sequoia, etc., regarding the development and deployment of their 
touch screen voting devices and systems. Such systems are subvertible in the extreme, as 
shown by, for example, the Johns Hopkins report [Kohno 2004]. 
The approach we take is to explore, incrementally, whether and how the existing manual UK 
voting system could be improved, in particular with regard to vote secrecy, accuracy and 
overall system efficiency (via the introduction of automation), without compromising the 
system’s insubvertibility, understandability and usability. In effect, we are at least in part 
being guided by the maxim that “a complex system that works is invariably found to have 
evolved from a simple system that works” [Gall 1975] (The approach is also reminiscent of 
the aphorism, usually attributed to either Peter Landin or Edsger Dijkstra, that “it’s easier to 
make a correct program efficient than an efficient program correct”.) 
Ideally we would like to eliminate the need to trust components of the system, whether they 
are technical or human, entirely. Schemes such as Fully Auditable Electronic Secret Ballots 
[Schoenmakers 2000], Secret-Ballot Receipts [Chaum 2004], VoteHere [Adler 2000] or Prêt 
à Voter [Chaum 2005] in large part achieve this, at least with respect to the accuracy 
requirements. However with such systems one still must ultimately trust in certain claimed 
properties of the cryptographic primitives. Moreover, the assurances that can be given 
regarding such systems are subject to certain probabilistic and computational assumptions. 
These are both issues that require highly specialised knowledge to appreciate properly.  
3. A “Scratch Card” Voting System 
In order to improve the voter secrecy provided by existing manual systems as used in the UK 
we suggest use of a ballot paper based on that used in the Prêt à Voter scheme. In this 
scheme: 
• the ballot papers are perforated vertically so that the column with the list of candidates 
can readily be separated from that on which the voter has recorded her vote, 
• the order in which the candidates are listed varies randomly from ballot paper to ballot 
paper, and  
                                                       
2 Problems of availability, even in the face of denial of service attacks, are we believe susceptible to 
standard solutions rather than specific to voting, and are not further addressed here. 
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• the voter is allowed to choose a ballot paper for herself at random from a large bundle of 
such papers.  
However, as shown in Figure 2, and in contrast to the Prêt à Voter scheme, at the foot of each 
column is printed a unique vote identification number (VIN). The left-hand column of the 
ballot paper (LHC) constitutes a vote receipt that can be retained by the voter after she has 
voted, while the right-hand portion (RHC) is carried forward into the vote counting process. 
Although the LHC does not, once separated from the RHC, provide any indication of how the 
voter cast her vote, it does provide an identifiable record of the fact that a vote has been cast, 
a record that can later be checked against the numbers on, or recorded from, the collected set 
of RHCs, should this be required. 
 
Figure 2: A ballot paper – before voting and after it has been made countable. 
The crucial aspect of our scheme, inspired by the cryptographic technique involved in the Prêt 
à Voter scheme, is that the RHC is, in effect, a so-called “scratch card”, in that it contains a 
small rectangle of opaque coating which is initially obscuring a pre-printed code. This code 
(OCN) identifies the order in which the candidates’ names were printed in the left-hand 
column. The copy of the VIN at the foot of this RHC is printed on this opaque coating. This 
coating can be scratched off, an act which simultaneously destroys the VIN and reveals the 
OCN. Up until the moment the VIN is scratched off (and, if any record of it has been kept, 
this record has also been destroyed) then it is possible to use the VIN as evidence that a vote 
has been cast, and has not been subsequently lost. 
As well as permitting the voter to choose her own ballot paper at random, she would also be 
permitted – indeed encouraged – to take other ballot papers and (i) to assure herself that they 
varied with regard to the ordering of the candidates, (ii) to scratch off the VINs (thereby 
invalidating their use as ballots) and so (iii) verify that in each case the revealed OCN 
matched the order of the candidates. (By this means she can be reassured that the still-
concealed OCN on the RHC that she actually uses in order to cast her vote is in all probability 
correct, i.e. matches the candidate ordering.) The testing and discarding of RHCs should be 
done under the supervision of the polling station officials. 
The above uses of the term “random” are rather casual – true randomness of the ballot papers 
is probably most fully ensured by inviting independent auditing authorities to take a random 
sample of ballot papers before the voting phase starts. They can perform statistical checks on 
the distribution of candidate ordering, the uniqueness of the VINs and remove the scratch 
strips to check the revealed OCNs match the candidate ordering in each case. Further random 
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checks could be performed during and (on left over ballot papers) even after the voting 
period. This exactly mirrors the procedures of the Prêt à Voter scheme. 
Actual vote casting requires the voter to proceed to a booth with a single ballot paper with its 
VIN strip still intact. In the booth, she indicates her vote by placing a cross in the appropriate 
cell on the RHC against the candidate of her choice in the usual fashion. She then splits the 
ballot paper along the perforation down the middle and posts the RHC into a locked ballot 
box, leaving the scratch strip intact, so as to preserve the secrecy of her vote. She can retain 
the LHC as her vote receipt.  
When the vote casting period has ended, the secure boxes of votes (RHCs) are taken from 
each voting station to a vote counting centre. Any RHCs with damaged or missing scratch 
strips that show up in the counting stage should be discounted, though this has to be done 
under supervision so as to avoid opening up possibilities for vote spoiling.  
In order to interpret the vote value encoded on each RHC, the VIN strip must be scratched off 
to reveal the OCN hidden underneath. The crucial property of this kind of scratch strip is that 
the process of revealing the hidden information underneath will destroy the information 
carried on top of the strip. 
Before the RHCs have their VINs scratched off, however, the VINs would be recorded and 
published (e.g. via a secure web bulletin board) so that each voter can use her vote receipt to 
check that her vote was indeed entered into the counting process. Ideally, such recording of 
the VINs should occur immediately before they are scratched off, and under close 
supervision, in order to ensure that the posted list exactly matches the numbers on RHCs 
entered into the device or process that removes the VIN scratch strips. This will provide a 
check that no votes have been lost and no fake ballot papers have been injected between the 
vote casting and the vote counting stage. 
The task of scratching the VINs off all the RHCs can be thought of as destroying the link on 
the RHC to the vote identification number and replacing this by a link from the RHC to the 
vote value. It is carried out by officials at the vote counting centre, and of course also needs to 
be supervised so as to ensure that it is carried out completely, and that no attempt is made to 
undermine the anonymity of the voting by recording VIN-OCN pairings as the one is 
scratched off to reveal the other. Ideally this process will be done in such a way as to shuffle 
the RHCs, so as to preclude associating a sequence of OCNs with any recorded sequence of 
the VINs that had hitherto obscured them. However, even if there is relatively little scrutiny 
of the act of scratching off the VINs, the overall confidentiality provided by the overall 
process is in practice likely to be generally regarded as exceeding that of the present-day UK 
voting process, given that the latter retains a tell-tale number on each ballot paper throughout 
the voting process, as well as carrying a clear indication of the actual vote. (We are assuming 
that other aspects of the existing UK scheme, aimed at authenticating voters and preventing 
multiple voting, would still be employed.) 
Once their OCNs have been revealed the RHCs could be used in a near-conventional process 
of (well-scrutinised) manual vote counting. This process might for example first involve 
sorting the RHCs into separate piles, according to the different OCNs on them, tallying each 
pile separately, and then using the codes to determine how these tallies are to be combined 
into an overall vote count.  
Given the general public’s experience of and trust in scratch cards (which are likely to be 
even more familiar to them than ballot papers) and in the act of shuffling playing cards, we 
believe that this vote counting process and indeed the whole voting scheme could gain a level 
of acceptance from the public regarding its overall trustworthiness comparable to that enjoyed 
by the manual scheme that is currently in use in the UK. The additional vote secrecy it 
provides should also be manifest to the general public. However, the scratch card scheme’s 
advantages over the existing manual scheme are not limited to vote secrecy. The fact that 
candidates’ names are not given in the same order on each ballot paper can be regarded as an 
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additional benefit, as there is evidence that a fixed candidate order can have an untoward 
influence on votes. 
4. A possible enhancement 
In this section we describe two elaborations of the basic, scratch card scheme introduced in 
Section 3 above. The resulting scheme is rather more robust in several respects, and is a 
closer analogy to the Prêt à Voter scheme. 
This scheme again uses the two strip ballot papers as before except that now we omit the VIN 
number on the LHC. The voter makes her mark, feeds the ballot paper into a device that 
detaches and destroys the LHC and scans the RHC. It produces two photocopies of the RHC, 
one is returned as her receipt, whilst the other is posted into a locked and sealed audit box 
(perhaps after being viewed under glass and confirmed by the voter in the manner of the 
“Mercuri method” [Mercuri 2002]). The “real” RHC (with scratch strip still intact) is posted 
into the locked and sealed ballot box. 
The ballot boxes are shipped off to the vote counting centre as before but now the VIN 
numbers and positions of the “X” marks are published. As before, voters can check these, but 
also auditors can do random checks of the correspondence between published receipts and the 
paper audit trails stored in the audit boxes. Note that, as with Prêt à Voter, the receipts do not 
reveal that way the vote was cast.  
This scheme has a number of advantages over the scheme presented in Section 3: 
• Receipts do now reflect, in encrypted form, the voter's choice and it can be checked that 
the “X” has not been altered in transit. 
• The checks on the list of published VIN numbers and positions of the “X” performed by 
the voters are supplemented by the auditor checks.  
• The approach suggested here has similarities to the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail 
(VVPAT [Mercuri 2002]) that has been advocated by various experts in the US. 
5. From Paper to Mechanism 
The question we now address is whether the basic scratch card scheme’s various 
characteristics, in particular those of insubvertibility and understandability, can be retained 
when various aspects of the scheme are automated in order to speed up the vote casting 
process and to reduce its costs. We deal with issues concerning vote casting and vote counting 
separately, and first of all concentrate on systems that retain the use of paper ballots since, in 
a nation such as the UK where paper ballot are the currently-trusted norm, we believe that it 
will be much easier to retain public trust if the usage of such paper ballots is retained in some 
form. 
5.1 Retaining Paper Ballots 
Particularly where voting is complicated (due to the number of candidates and the number of 
choices that a voter has to make), there would be merit in the use of a voting machine in 
connection with the paper ballots. At its simplest, such a machine would be one that could 
receive a pre-printed ballot paper, check that it is unmarked and still had an intact VIN 
scratch strip on it, and merely assist the voter with the task of marking this ballot paper in 
accordance with whatever electoral rules apply to the voting, for example by ensuring that the 
resulting ballot paper is “guaranteed” to be both legible and valid. This might speed up the 
voting casting process, and should reduce the number of accidentally spoilt ballot papers. In 
the US context, for example, the machine might warn the voter of possible under-voting or 
over-voting. 
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A more complex machine would also do the actual printing of the ballot paper, after enabling 
the voter to randomize the ordering of the candidates, for example using a facility that 
deliberately mimics the action of a mechanical or electronic one-arm bandit, and which then 
allows the voter to indicate her vote. (There would of course be a need to undertake adequate 
checking of the design of such machines and their operation, tasks that would be aided by the 
machines’ relative physical simplicity.)  
The resulting printed ballot paper then can either have its VIN scratched off by the voter (for 
purposes of checking that the machine does generate OCNs which match the candidate 
ordering) so invalidating the ballot paper, or can be used by her to cast a vote as before. The 
advantage of such a device is that it would presumably give the voters a greater confidence in 
the randomness of the OCN lists so generated. Whether such confidence is well placed is of 
course another matter. (The problem of validating sources of randomness, such as gaming 
machines, is itself the source of delicate challenges.) 
Note that any malfunctioning or corruption of the device, at least from the accuracy point of 
view, would be detectable and verifiable. Thus if the device attempted to print OCNs on the 
ballot forms that did not match the candidate ordering, should voters check the forms they can 
demonstrate to an official that the machine is malfunctioning or corrupt. 
The fact that such voting machines produce checkable printed ballot papers (of the form 
shown in Figure 2) should, we argue, ensure voters’ willingness to trust that the system is not 
adversely affected by the use of such machines, even if the average voter has no idea how the 
machines actually work. (A general public that is already familiar with and prepared to trust 
existing electro-mechanical voting machines, such as in the USA, would we presume be quite 
willing to invest at least as much trust, with respect to both accuracy and confidentiality, in a 
voting process based on the use of such machines as they do in the use of existing voting 
machines.)  
The counting of paper votes (RHCs) could be done using one or more special-purpose devices 
whose design (possibly, indeed preferably, electromechanical rather than electronic) was so 
simple and operation so visible that it could be reasonably readily scrutinised and audited. In 
particular, sorting physical votes into piles and tallying these piles could be done by machines 
not unlike conventional (albeit old-fashioned) electro-mechanical Hollerith/IBM mark-sensed 
card sorters – to the front end of which had been added a set of brushes that first removed the 
coating on which the VINs were printed. (Alternatively, one can envisage use of a machine 
that processed a large set of votes en masse, removing this coating, before any counting is 
done.) This type of electromechanical machine is not too dissimilar to the sorts of vote 
counting machines that have been used and generally accepted (when properly monitored by 
trustworthy officials) in some parts of the USA for many years.  
5.2 Electronic Vote Counting 
Major trust concerns arise when one moves away from the use of paper ballots either partly 
(in that paper voting receipts might still be retained) or completely, so that the vote casting as 
well as counting is all done essentially invisibly, e.g. electronically. Even if the public have 
good reason to believe that electronic versions of their votes are reaching the vote counting 
process safely, the problem is to provide the public with continued reason to trust a vote 
counting process that is not directly visible to ordinary officials and scrutineers. 
For simplicity, in what follows we ignore the possibility of any part of the vote counting 
being done at voting stations, and instead assume that either (i) votes are transported securely 
in paper form to the vote counting centre, where the VINs are recorded and scratched off and 
the OCNs revealed, as described in Section 3 above, and the information on the RHC then 
read electronically, or (ii) the VINs are recorded and scratched off at each voting centre, 
under appropriate scrutiny of course, and the indication of the candidate choice, plus the OCN 
that was revealed by scratching off the VIN, are fed into a reader to be securely transmitted 
electronically to the vote counting centre. Evidently, in the first case it is possible to provide 
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the voter with a more plausible means of confirming that her vote actually reached the vote 
counting centre safely. 
The votes can then be tabulated electronically, taking into account each vote’s OCN, possibly 
after having first been sorted into separate sets according to the OCN, in much the same way 
that this process could have been carried out manually with paper ballots. However, vote 
counting machines, or indeed voting machines, i.e. DRE (direct recording electronic) devices, 
that have a conventional general-purpose computer and operating system incorporated into 
them are problematic and likely to remain controversial. Their use normally requires a degree 
of trust that the more technically-aware voters in particular are likely to be reluctant to 
provide, given that computers and their software pose major problems to scrutineers and 
auditors, and the present – very understandable – public concern about software bugs, Trojan 
horses, viruses, etc. [Lauer 2004]. 
Indeed, with electronic votes various forms of “online” manual checking by multiple 
observers will normally have to be replaced or supplemented by (i) prior checking of the 
design of possibly very sophisticated algorithms and devices, and (ii) ensuring the continued 
relevance of the results of these checks up to and during the actual voting process. There is 
for example little point in formally verifying the design of some software employed within an 
electronic voting system if one cannot be certain that the software has not been subsequently 
replaced or interfered with – an example of the TOCTOU (Time-Of-Check-to-Time-Of-Use) 
problem, one which was demonstrated to have occurred quite flagrantly with Diebold’s 
Global Election Systems DRE machines [Harris 2003]. Ideally, therefore, these algorithms 
and devices should be as simple and as evidently independent of each other as possible, and 
susceptible to having their operation completely checked via examination of just their inputs 
and outputs. The use of multiple physically-separate simple special purpose devices would in 
fact facilitate constructing a case for their combined trustworthiness from arguments about 
their individual trustworthiness, cf. the approach to security via separability [Rushby 1982]. 
An alternative approach that has been taken by others to the design of electronic voting 
systems is to attempt to devise and validate means whereby the complete set of activities 
making up the process, from vote to count, could (i) be achieved entirely electronically, using 
some sort of cryptographic equivalent of the scratch card mechanism, and (ii) incorporate 
some scheme for allowing (at least probabilistic) checks to be made that all the votes are 
being properly accounted for – this is the approach taken in the Prêt à Voter scheme [Chaum 
2005]. Minimally, such checks would routinely be made at various stages during the process, 
and especially immediately after completion of the vote counting and before the election 
result was announced, not just when for some reason suspicions are raised. Another, rather 
different fully-electronic approach is described by Schoenmakers [2000]. This enables secret 
and auditable voting via the Internet, using cryptographic techniques such as verifiable secret 
sharing and zero-knowledge protocols, together with multiple independent vote-tallying 
facilities that provide a form of “distributed trust”. However, although with such voting 
schemes the computers and the software involved need not be trusted, the arguments for the 
trustworthiness of the overall voting system are subtle and require specialist knowledge in 
order to be properly appreciated.  
A very different approach involves the use of a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail [Mercuri 
2002] as an adjunct to an electronic voting casting and counting system. With such an 
approach, the need is to ensure (i) that the audit trail mechanism, rather than the actual voting 
system per se, is adequately trustworthy, and (ii) that recourse will be had to this audit trail 
mechanism whenever necessary. This latter issue will involve careful and extensive scrutiny 
of the audit trail and of the operation of the voting casting and counting, if low error rates or 
subtle attempts at subversion are to be reliably detected. 
There is, however, a fundamental requirement for any e-voting system to be not just 
trustworthy, but also trusted. Moreover, it has to be trusted by the average voter (with regard 
to the act of voting), by the electoral officials and political representatives (with regard to the 
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whole process of carrying out and scrutinising vote recording, tallying and totalling), and as a 
whole by the public at large and the media. (Similar points are made in [Jones 2004c].) 
Acceptance of the deployed system’s trustworthiness by reputable technical specialists in e-
voting, while necessary, unfortunately may not be sufficient to engender such trust, if neither 
these specialists nor anyone else is capable of explaining the system and the basis of its 
claimed trustworthiness in very simple and convincing terms. (Realistic trials can of course 
help, providing these trials involve very extensive and expert – but unsuccessful – attempts at 
achieving subversion.) Moreover, such explanations must be sufficiently persuasive to 
counteract the effects of any apparently justifiable allegations about the trustworthiness of the 
system made by other individuals or organisations who for whatever reason are opposed to e-
voting. This we would suggest is an as-yet unsolved (socio-technical) problem. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, as a step towards the ultimate aim of an e-voting system that is both trusted and 
trustworthy, we have (i) described a design for a manual voting scheme that has we claim 
significant advantages over existing trusted manual schemes, and then (ii) used this design as 
the basis for a small set of (in most cases just partially-automated) voting systems which 
could improve the efficiency of our proposed manual voting scheme. This is going a 
significant step further than that advocated by [Jones 2004c]: 
“What I believe we must seek is a decomposition of the election 
problem into technological components where the essential properties 
of those components are subject [accessible demonstration]. This does 
not require that the internal workings of the system be entirely 
revealed, but rather, it places each such component inside a shell of 
easy-to-audit defenses. Another way of thinking about this is that we 
are attempting to reduce the size of the trusted base of hardware and 
software to the point that the trusted base can be entirely disclosed and 
where the logic of that trusted base is clear to a bright high school 
student.” 
Our claim is that at least all the manual or partially-automated systems we have described 
above stand a good chance of gaining and retaining the degree of trust that is accorded to 
present-day manual voting systems in the UK. Moreover, they provide an increased level of 
security, together with some degree of voter verifiability in that voters are able to confirm that 
a ballot paper bearing their VIN number was entered into the tabulation process. This is in 
contrast to most existing voting systems in which the voters are not provided with any such 
checking capability. However, it falls short of the level of assurance provided by 
cryptographic schemes, such as Chaum’s scheme, VoteHere and Prêt à Voter, in that the 
voters still need to trust the mechanisms and processes that strip off the scratch strips and 
shuffle the resulting RHCs to do so in a way that will not corrupt any of the ballots (e.g., lose 
ballots, inject fake ballots, alter ballots).  
We have argued that carefully designed mechanisms along with conventional scrutiny 
procedures should lead to good levels of assurance. But we note that the cryptographic 
schemes are able to replace such trust with cryptographic mechanisms that ensure that any 
non-negligible corruption during this tabulation would, with high probability, be detected. 
The trouble is that (i) such a cryptographic scheme is not readily explainable to the general 
public, and (ii) evaluations provided by technical experts may not be enough to persuade the 
public to put their trust in it.  
Our approach to the design of our schemes and its presentation has of necessity been socio-
technical as much as technical, in that we have deliberately tried - in pursuit of user 
acceptance and trust - to retain the familiarity and simplicity of current well-accepted devices 
and systems. As a result, in most of our proposals we have deliberately sought to retain at 
least some use of paper, and to avoid, or at least minimize the use of, electronics and 
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computers. (For a discussion of such matters see, for example, [Economist 2004] and [Jones 
2004b, 2004c].) This, we have found ourselves arguing, somewhat to our own initial surprise, 
is perhaps one of the most practical ways of achieving and retaining the trust and confidence 
of the general public in any new automated or semi-automated voting scheme. However this 
claim requires (i) thorough analysis, e.g. by psychologists and sociologists, concerning the 
relative importance of the many factors that can affect public trust (see for example [Misztal 
1996], [O’Neill 2002] and [Ulivieri 2005]) and how these might apply to election systems, 
and (ii) proper validation, via extensive trials designed and supervised by expert experimental 
psychologists and sociologists, not just pilot demonstration voting exercises. (One study we 
are aware of concerning public trust in e-voting was based on a small-scale trial of the TruE-
Vote system [Oostveen 2003]. This found that “The more people trust in the security and the 
better the usability of the system, the less they will doubt about the ability to verify the count 
of the vote. . . However, a lot of the variables that correlate with the trust in verifiability have 
nothing to do with the technology itself, but more with the social context in which the new 
technology is embedded”. The study concluded “People should not just have to trust in the 
integrity of a voting system or the people who designed, developed and implemented it. . . In 
order to fully understand citizens’ willingness to use electronic voting systems we need to 
look as much into socio-political issues as into technological issues.” [Oostveen 2004]) 
An alternative approach to the goal of designing an widely acceptable e-voting system is to 
not to start with an existing trusted system but instead with a sophisticated e-voting system 
that is believed to be technically trustworthy, for example Prêt à Voter, and try to simplify the 
design and the description, to the point where one could expect the general public to accept it. 
This approach continues to be pursued and we would hope that the two may converge. To 
paraphrase the Landin/Dijkstra quote above: “perhaps it’s easier to make a correct scheme 
accessible than an accessible scheme correct”.) 
We, and others, have argued that the design of e-voting systems must in fact be treated as a 
socio-technical problem, and indeed one that might with benefit be treated differently in 
countries with differing existing practices and attitudes. In fact we believe that at least equal 
weight must be given to socio-technical issues such as (i) system understandability and 
usability, and (ii) the roles, both positive and negative, likely to be played by the various 
people and organisations involved in the overall voting process, as is given to any attestations 
by technical experts as to the trustworthiness of complex e-voting hardware and software. 
The goal that we set ourselves in this paper is very challenging: to develop a system that 
provides high assurance of accuracy and secrecy with minimal trust in the components of the 
system, whilst being at the same time sufficiently simple to be generally understandable by 
the electorate at large. It may in fact turn out to be impossible to achieve all of these in a 
single scheme, in which case it will be necessary to back off certain aspects of these 
requirements. We might not require such high levels of assurance, or decide that it is 
acceptable to allow a greater degree of dependence on certain components or processes. 
Alternatively, one might decide that striving for complete understandability by the electorate 
is unreasonable and so strive for “sufficient” simplicity and appropriate explanations and 
metaphors to achieve acceptance and trust. But the justification of any such decisions is again 
essentially a socio-technical, or at least a political, problem.  
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